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Gain Code Execution on ADFS Server via Remote WMI Execution

Description

'This query detects instances where an attacker has gained the ability to execute code on an ADFS Server through remote WMI Execution. In order to use this query you need to be collecting Sysmon EventIDs 19, 20, and 21. If you do not have Sysmon data in your workspace this query will raise an error stating: Failed to resolve scalar expression named "[@Name]" For more on how WMI was used in Solorigate see https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/. The query contains some features from the following detections to look for potentially malicious ADFS activity. See them for more details. - ADFS DKM Master Key Export: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/MultipleDataSources/ADFS-DKM-MasterKey-Export.yaml'
Type de règle
Scheduled
Version
1.1.4
Fréquence
1d
Période analysée
7d
Déclenchement
gt 0

Couverture MITRE déclarée

Sources déclarées

Métadonnées du fichier source. Aucune dépendance déduite du KQL.

Connecteurs

Types de données

Requête KQL

Requête originale, sans modification.

let timeframe = 1d;
// Adjust for a longer timeframe for identifying ADFS Servers
let lookback = 6d;
// Identify ADFS Servers
let ADFS_Servers = ( union isfuzzy=true
( Event
| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe+lookback)
| where Source == "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon"
| where EventID == 1
| extend EventData = parse_xml(EventData).DataItem.EventData.Data
| mv-expand bagexpansion=array EventData
| evaluate bag_unpack(EventData)
| extend Key=tostring(['@Name']), Value=['#text']
| evaluate pivot(Key, any(Value), TimeGenerated, Source, EventLog, Computer, EventLevel, EventLevelName, UserName, RenderedDescription, MG, ManagementGroupName, Type, _ResourceId)
| extend process = split(Image, '\\', -1)[-1]
| where process =~ "Microsoft.IdentityServer.ServiceHost.exe"
| distinct Computer
),
( SecurityEvent
| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe+lookback)
| where EventID == 4688 and SubjectLogonId != "0x3e4"
| where ProcessName has "Microsoft.IdentityServer.ServiceHost.exe"
| distinct Computer
),
(WindowsEvent
| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe+lookback)
| where EventID == 4688 and EventData has "0x3e4" and EventData has "Microsoft.IdentityServer.ServiceHost.exe"
| extend SubjectLogonId  = tostring(EventData.SubjectLogonId)
| where SubjectLogonId != "0x3e4"
| extend ProcessName  = tostring(EventData.ProcessName)
| where ProcessName has "Microsoft.IdentityServer.ServiceHost.exe"
| distinct Computer
)
| distinct Computer);
(union isfuzzy=true
(
SecurityEvent
| where EventID == 4688
| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe)
| where Computer in~ (ADFS_Servers)
| where ParentProcessName has 'wmiprvse.exe'
// Looking for rundll32.exe is based on intel from the blog linked in the description
// This can be commented out or altered to filter out known internal uses
| where CommandLine has_any ('rundll32') 
| project TimeGenerated, TargetAccount, CommandLine, Computer, Account, TargetLogonId
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated
| extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))
| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)
| extend AccountName = tostring(split(Account, "\\")[0]), AccountNTDomain = tostring(split(Account, "\\")[1])
// Search for recent logons to identify lateral movement
| join kind= inner
(SecurityEvent
| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe)
| where EventID == 4624 and LogonType == 3
| where Account !endswith "$"
| project TargetLogonId
) on TargetLogonId
),
(
WindowsEvent
| where EventID == 4688
| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe)
| where Computer in~ (ADFS_Servers)
| where EventData has 'wmiprvse.exe' and EventData has_any ('rundll32') 
| extend ParentProcessName = tostring(EventData.ParentProcessName)
| where ParentProcessName has 'wmiprvse.exe'
// Looking for rundll32.exe is based on intel from the blog linked in the description
// This can be commented out or altered to filter out known internal uses
| extend CommandLine = tostring(EventData.CommandLine)
| where CommandLine has_any ('rundll32') 
| extend TargetAccount = strcat(EventData.TargetDomainName,"\\", EventData.TargetUserName)
| extend Account = strcat(EventData.TargetDomainName,"\\", EventData.TargetUserName)
| extend TargetLogonId = tostring(EventData.TargetLogonId)
| project TimeGenerated, TargetAccount, CommandLine, Computer, Account, TargetLogonId
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated
| extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))
| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)
| extend AccountName = tostring(split(Account, "\\")[0]), AccountNTDomain = tostring(split(Account, "\\")[1])
// Search for recent logons to identify lateral movement
| join kind= inner
(WindowsEvent
| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe)
| where EventID == 4624 
| extend  LogonType = tostring(EventData.LogonType)
| where LogonType == 3
| extend Account = strcat(EventData.TargetDomainName,"\\", EventData.TargetUserName)
| where Account !endswith "$"
| extend TargetLogonId = tostring(EventData.TargetLogonId)
| project TargetLogonId
) on TargetLogonId
),
(
Event
| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe)
| where Source == "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon"
// Check for WMI Events
| where Computer in~ (ADFS_Servers) and EventID in (19, 20, 21)
| extend EventData = parse_xml(EventData).DataItem.EventData.Data
| mv-expand bagexpansion=array EventData
| evaluate bag_unpack(EventData)
| extend Key=tostring(['@Name']), Value=['#text']
| evaluate pivot(Key, any(Value), TimeGenerated, Source, EventLog, Computer, EventLevel, EventLevelName, UserName, RenderedDescription, MG, ManagementGroupName, Type, _ResourceId)
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Image, Computer, UserName
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated
| extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))
| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)
| extend AccountName = tostring(split(UserName, "\\")[0]), AccountNTDomain = tostring(split(UserName, "\\")[1])
)
)

Entités déclarées

AccountHost

Contenus associés

Liens établis à partir des identifiants déclarés et des manifests des solutions.

Traçabilité de la source

GitHub

Les valeurs affichées proviennent des fichiers du dépôt Azure/Azure-Sentinel. Elles décrivent le modèle publié, pas la configuration de votre workspace.

Identifiant source
0bd65651-1404-438b-8f63-eecddcec87b4
Autres fichiers source 1Detections/MultipleDataSources/GainCodeExecutionADFSviaWMI.yamlsource ↗
GSTEP / SUIVI DU CATALOGUE

Ajouté au catalogue : 16 sept. 2026 · 05:49 UTC
Dernier changement observé : 16 sept. 2026 · 05:49 UTC

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