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AWSCloudTrail - Privilege escalation via CRUD Lambda policy

Description

Detects inline IAM policy updates that grant broad AWS Lambda lifecycle permissions and related destructive capabilities. This behavior can establish execution control paths and may indicate privilege escalation through unauthorized policy expansion.

Type de règle: Scheduled
Version: 1.0.2
Statut déclaré: Available
Fréquence: 1d
Période analysée: 1d
Déclenchement: gt 0

Couverture MITRE déclarée

PrivilegeEscalation T1098.003

Sources déclarées

Métadonnées du fichier source. Aucune dépendance déduite du KQL.

Connecteurs

AWS

Types de données

AWSCloudTrail

Requête KQL

Requête originale, sans modification.

AWSCloudTrail
| where EventName in ("PutUserPolicy","PutRolePolicy","PutGroupPolicy") and isempty(ErrorCode) and isempty(ErrorMessage)
| extend PolicyName = tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).policyName)
| extend Statement = parse_json(tostring((parse_json(RequestParameters).policyDocument))).Statement
| mvexpand Statement
| extend Action = parse_json(Statement).Action , Effect = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Effect), Resource = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Resource), Condition = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Condition)
| extend Action = tostring(Action)
| where Effect =~ "Allow" and (Action contains "lambda:Create" and Action contains "lambda:Get" and Action contains "lambda:Update" and Action contains "kms:Delete") and Resource == "*" and Condition == ""
| extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
| extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
| extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
| extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
  AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "")
| distinct TimeGenerated, EventName, PolicyName, SourceIpAddress, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, UserIdentityArn, UserIdentityUserName

Entités déclarées

AccountIP

Contenus associés

Liens établis à partir des identifiants déclarés et des manifests des solutions.

Traçabilité de la source

GitHub

Les valeurs affichées proviennent des fichiers du dépôt Azure/Azure-Sentinel. Elles décrivent le modèle publié, pas la configuration de votre workspace.

Fichier: Solutions/Amazon Web Services/Analytic Rules/AWS_PrivilegeEscalationViaCRUDLambdaPolicy.yaml ↗
Commit: 9800e51 ↗
Identifiant source: d0953d50-3dc1-4fa3-80fa-4d3e973a0959

Autres fichiers source 2

Solutions/Amazon Web Services/Analytic Rules/AWS_PrivilegeEscalationViaCRUDLambdaPolicy.yamlsource ↗Solutions/Amazon Web Services/Data/Solution_AmazonWebServices.jsonsolution-membership ↗

GSTEP / SUIVI DU CATALOGUE

Ajouté au catalogue : 16 sept. 2026 · 05:49 UTC
Dernier changement observé : 16 sept. 2026 · 05:49 UTC

Dates de synchronisation GSTEP, distinctes des dates de publication du contenu source.