↳ Source GitHubRègle analytiqueMedium

AD FS Remote HTTP Network Connection

Description

'This detection uses Sysmon events (NetworkConnect events) to detect incoming network traffic on port 80 on AD FS servers. This could be a sign of a threat actor trying to use replication services on the AD FS server to get its configuration settings and extract sensitive information such as AD FS certificates. In order to use this query you need to enable Sysmon telemetry on the AD FS Server. Reference: https://twitter.com/OTR_Community/status/1387038995016732672 '
Type de règle
Scheduled
Version
1.0.2
Statut déclaré
Available
Fréquence
1d
Période analysée
1d
Déclenchement
gt 0

Couverture MITRE déclarée

Sources déclarées

Métadonnées du fichier source. Aucune dépendance déduite du KQL.

Connecteurs

Types de données

Requête KQL

Requête originale, sans modification.

// Adjust this to use a longer timeframe to identify ADFS servers
//let lookback = 0d;
// Adjust this to adjust detection timeframe
//let timeframe = 1d;
// Filter out other servers in the AD FS farm
let ADFSServersList = dynamic(["ADFS02.domain.com","ADFS03.domain.com"]);
// Start by identifying ADFS servers to reduce FP chance
let ADFS_Servers = (
Event
//| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe+lookback)
| where Source == "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon"
| where EventID == 18
| where Computer !in (ADFSServersList)
| extend EventData = parse_xml(EventData).DataItem.EventData.Data
| mv-expand bagexpansion=array EventData
| evaluate bag_unpack(EventData)
| extend Key = tostring(column_ifexists('@Name', "")), Value = column_ifexists('#text', "")
| evaluate pivot(Key, any(Value), TimeGenerated, Source, EventLog, Computer, EventLevel, EventLevelName, EventID, UserName, MG, ManagementGroupName, _ResourceId)
| extend Image = column_ifexists("Image", "")
| extend process = split(Image, '\\', -1)[-1]
| where process =~ "Microsoft.IdentityServer.ServiceHost.exe"
| summarize by Computer
);
// Look for ADFS servers receiving connections over port 80
Event
//| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe)
| where Source == "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon"
| where Computer in~ (ADFS_Servers)
| extend RenderedDescription = tostring(split(RenderedDescription, ":")[0])
| extend EventData = parse_xml(EventData).DataItem.EventData.Data
| mv-expand bagexpansion=array EventData
| evaluate bag_unpack(EventData)
| extend Key = tostring(column_ifexists('@Name', "")), Value = column_ifexists('#text', "")
| evaluate pivot(Key, any(Value), TimeGenerated, Source, EventLog, Computer, EventLevel, EventLevelName, EventID, UserName, RenderedDescription, MG, ManagementGroupName, _ResourceId)
| extend RuleName = column_ifexists("RuleName", ""), TechniqueId = column_ifexists("TechniqueId", ""),  TechniqueName = column_ifexists("TechniqueName", "")
| parse RuleName with * 'technique_id=' TechniqueId ',' * 'technique_name=' TechniqueName
| where EventID == 3
// Look for endpoints connecting to the AD FS server over port 80
| extend DestinationPort = column_ifexists("DestinationPort", ""), Image = column_ifexists("Image", ""), Initiated = column_ifexists("Initiated", ""), SourceIp = column_ifexists("DestinationIp", ""), DestinationIp = column_ifexists("DestinationIp", "")
| where DestinationPort == 80
| extend process = split(Image, '\\', -1)[-1]
// Look for the System process receiving connections
| where process == 'System' and Initiated == 'false'
| where DestinationIp !in ('::1','0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1')
| extend Operation = RenderedDescription
| project-reorder TimeGenerated, Operation, Image, Computer, UserName
| extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))
| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)
| extend AccountName = tostring(split(UserName, @'\')[1]), AccountNTDomain = tostring(split(UserName, @'\')[0])

Entités déclarées

AccountHostIP

Contenus associés

Liens établis à partir des identifiants déclarés et des manifests des solutions.

Traçabilité de la source

GitHub

Les valeurs affichées proviennent des fichiers du dépôt Azure/Azure-Sentinel. Elles décrivent le modèle publié, pas la configuration de votre workspace.

Identifiant source
d57c33a9-76b9-40e0-9dfa-ff0404546410
Autres fichiers source 3Solutions/Windows Security Events/Analytic Rules/ADFSRemoteHTTPNetworkConnection.yamlsource ↗Detections/SecurityEvent/ADFSRemoteHTTPNetworkConnection.yamlmigration-note ↗Solutions/Windows Security Events/Data/Solution_Windows Security Events.jsonsolution-membership ↗
GSTEP / SUIVI DU CATALOGUE

Ajouté au catalogue : 16 sept. 2026 · 05:49 UTC
Dernier changement observé : 16 sept. 2026 · 05:49 UTC

Dates de synchronisation GSTEP, distinctes des dates de publication du contenu source.