↳ Source GitHubRègle analytiqueMedium

Suspicious access of BEC related documents in AWS S3 buckets

Description

'This query looks for users with suspicious spikes in the number of files accessed that relate to topics commonly accessed as part of Business Email Compromise (BEC) attacks. The query looks for access to files in AWS S3 storage that relate to topics such as invoices or payments, and then looks for users accessing these files in significantly higher numbers than in the previous 14 days. Incidents raised by this analytic should be investigated to see if the user accessing these files should be accessing them, and if the volume they accessed them at was related to a legitimate business need. This query contains thresholds to reduce the chance of false positives, these can be adjusted to suit individual environments. In addition false positives could be generated by legitimate, scheduled actions that occur less often than every 14 days, additional exclusions can be added for these actions on username or IP address entities.'
Type de règle
Scheduled
Version
1.0.4
Fréquence
1d
Période analysée
14d
Déclenchement
gt 0

Couverture MITRE déclarée

Sources déclarées

Métadonnées du fichier source. Aucune dépendance déduite du KQL.

Connecteurs

Types de données

Requête KQL

Requête originale, sans modification.

let BEC_Keywords = dynamic([ 'invoice','payment','paycheck','transfer','bank statement','bank details','closing','funds','bank account','account details','remittance','purchase','deposit',"PO#","Zahlung","Rechnung","Paiement", "virement bancaire","Bankuberweisung",'hacked','phishing']);
// Adjust this threshold based on your environment
let sensitivity = 2.5;
let Events = materialize(AWSCloudTrail
| where TimeGenerated between (ago(14d)..ago(0d))
| where UserIdentityAccountId != "anonymous"
| where EventSource startswith "s3."
| where EventName =~ "GetObject"
| extend FilePath = tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).key)
| where FilePath has_any(BEC_Keywords)
);
Events
| summarize dcount(FilePath) by UserIdentityPrincipalid, bin(startofday(TimeGenerated), 1d)
| summarize CountOfDocs = make_list(dcount_FilePath, 10000), TimeStamp = make_list(TimeGenerated, 10000) by UserIdentityPrincipalid
| extend (Anomalies, Score, Baseline) = series_decompose_anomalies(CountOfDocs, sensitivity, -1, 'linefit')
| mv-expand CountOfDocs to typeof(double), TimeStamp to typeof(datetime), Anomalies to typeof(double),Score to typeof(double), Baseline to typeof(long)
| where Anomalies > 0
| project TimeStamp, CountOfDocs, Baseline, Score, Anomalies, UserIdentityPrincipalid
| join kind=inner(Events | extend TimeStamp = startofday(TimeGenerated)) on TimeStamp, UserIdentityPrincipalid
| extend Name = iif(UserIdentityUserName contains "@", split(UserIdentityUserName, "@")[0], UserIdentityUserName)
| extend UPNSuffix = iif(UserIdentityUserName contains "@", split(UserIdentityUserName, "@")[1], "")
| project-reorder TimeGenerated, UserIdentityType, UserIdentityPrincipalid, UserIdentityUserName, FilePath, EventName, UserAgent, SourceIpAddress, CountOfDocs, Baseline, Score

Entités déclarées

AccountIPFile

Contenus associés

Liens établis à partir des identifiants déclarés et des manifests des solutions.

Traçabilité de la source

GitHub

Les valeurs affichées proviennent des fichiers du dépôt Azure/Azure-Sentinel. Elles décrivent le modèle publié, pas la configuration de votre workspace.

Identifiant source
f3e2d35f-1202-4215-995c-4654ef07d1d8
Autres fichiers source 2Solutions/Business Email Compromise - Financial Fraud/Analytic Rules/SuspiciousAccessOfBECRelatedDocumentsInAWSS3Buckets.yamlsource ↗Solutions/Business Email Compromise - Financial Fraud/Data/Solution_Business Email Compromise - Financial Fraud.jsonsolution-membership ↗
GSTEP / SUIVI DU CATALOGUE

Ajouté au catalogue : 16 sept. 2026 · 05:49 UTC
Dernier changement observé : 16 sept. 2026 · 05:49 UTC

Dates de synchronisation GSTEP, distinctes des dates de publication du contenu source.