↳ Source GitHubRègle analytiqueHigh
[Entra ID] Privileged Role Assigned to User
Description
Detects when a user is assigned a privileged role in Microsoft Entra ID. This may indicate unauthorized privilege escalation and should be validated promptly.
- Type de règle
- Scheduled
- Version
- 1.0.0
- Statut déclaré
- Available
- Fréquence
- 2h
- Période analysée
- 2h
- Déclenchement
- gt 0
Couverture MITRE déclarée
Sources déclarées
Métadonnées du fichier source. Aucune dépendance déduite du KQL.
Connecteurs
Types de données
Requête KQL
Requête originale, sans modification.
AuditLogs
| where Category =~ "RoleManagement"
| where AADOperationType in ("Assign", "AssignEligibleRole", "CreateRequestGrantedRole", "CreateRequestPermanentEligibleRole", "CreateRequestPermanentGrantedRole")
| where ActivityDisplayName has_any ("Add eligible member to role", "Add member to role")
| mv-apply TargetResourceSubject = TargetResources on
(
where TargetResourceSubject.type in~ ("User", "ServicePrincipal")
| extend
Target = iff(TargetResourceSubject.type =~ "ServicePrincipal", tostring(TargetResourceSubject.displayName), tostring(TargetResourceSubject.userPrincipalName)),
subjectProps = TargetResourceSubject.modifiedProperties
)
| mv-apply TargetResourceRole = TargetResources on
(
// mimic modifiedProperties so we can use the same logic to get the role name regardless of where it comes from
where TargetResourceRole.type in~ ("Role")
| extend roleProps = pack_array(bag_pack("displayName", "Role.DisplayName", "newValue", TargetResourceRole.displayName))
)
| mv-apply Property = iff(array_length(subjectProps) > 0, subjectProps, roleProps) on
(
where Property.displayName =~ "Role.DisplayName"
| extend RoleName = trim('"', tostring(Property.newValue))
)
| where RoleName contains "Admin"
| extend InitiatingAppName = tostring(InitiatedBy.app.displayName)
| extend InitiatingAppServicePrincipalId = tostring(InitiatedBy.app.servicePrincipalId)
| extend InitiatingUserPrincipalName = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName)
| extend InitiatingAadUserId = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.id)
| extend InitiatingIpAddress = tostring(iff(isnotempty(InitiatedBy.user.ipAddress), InitiatedBy.user.ipAddress, InitiatedBy.app.ipAddress))
| extend Initiator = iif(isnotempty(InitiatingAppName), InitiatingAppName, InitiatingUserPrincipalName)
// Comment below to alert for PIM activations
| where Initiator != "MS-PIM"
| summarize
by
bin(TimeGenerated, 1h),
OperationName,
RoleName,
Target,
Initiator,
InitiatingUserPrincipalName,
InitiatingAadUserId,
InitiatingAppName,
InitiatingAppServicePrincipalId,
InitiatingIpAddress,
Result
| extend
TargetName = tostring(split(Target, '@', 0)[0]),
TargetUPNSuffix = tostring(split(Target, '@', 1)[0]),
InitiatorName = tostring(split(InitiatingUserPrincipalName, '@', 0)[0]),
InitiatorUPNSuffix = tostring(split(InitiatingUserPrincipalName, '@', 1)[0])
| extend
Source_Network_IPLocation = "",
ActivityType=OperationName
| project
Alert_Category_en = "Entra ID",
Alert_SubCategory_en = "Anomaly Identity Privilege Modification",
Alert_Name_en = "User Assigned a Privileged Role",
Alert_Description_en = strcat(
"At Taiwan time: ",
format_datetime(datetime_utc_to_local(TimeGenerated, "Asia/Taipei"), "yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss"),
"in the Microsoft Entra ID tenant",
", operator: ",
iff(isnotempty(Initiator), Initiator, "<UnknownInitiator>"),
", from IP: ",
InitiatingIpAddress,
", assigned privileged role ",
tostring(RoleName),
" to user ",
iff(isnotempty(Target), Target, "<NoTargetUser>"),
". This behavior is a high-risk permission change and must be validated immediately."
),
Alert_TriageStep_en = strcat(
"1. Confirm whether the privileged role assignment was performed through an Entra ID PIM-approved change process.",
"2. Confirm with the operator: ",
iff(isnotempty(Initiator), Initiator, "<UnknownInitiator>"),
" whether this was performed by the account owner.",
"3. Check whether the source IP and geolocation are abnormal or not a company public IP."
),
Alert_Containment_en = strcat(
"1. If this is determined to be an unauthorized role assignment, immediately revoke the privileged role from target user ",
iff(isnotempty(Target), Target, "<NoTargetUser>"),
" 's privileged role (",
tostring(RoleName),
"), and restore the state to before the change.",
"2. Immediately restrict or suspend the operator that performed the role assignment (user or application), revoke sign-in tokens, and force MFA/password reset as needed. ",
"3. If the source is an application (",
iff(isnotempty(InitiatingAppName), InitiatingAppName, "<NoServicePrincipal>"),
"), immediately disable the Service Principal and revoke high-privilege API consent and credentials/secrets."
),
Alert_Remediation_en = strcat(
"1. Allow privileged role access only through Entra ID PIM.",
"2. Enforce Conditional Access and MFA for role management and PIM operations, allowing them only from managed devices and named locations.",
"3. Establish real-time alerts and automated response (SOAR) for privileged role changes to detect abnormal role assignments immediately. "
),
Alert_Time_TW = datetime_utc_to_local(TimeGenerated, "Asia/Taipei"),
Alert_Time_UTC0 = TimeGenerated,
Event_Action = ActivityType,
Event_Status = Result,
//Event_Description = ActivityDisplayName,
Source_Identity_FullName = iff(isnotempty(Initiator), Initiator, InitiatingAppName),
//Source_Identity_ID = ActorID,
Source_Identity_Type = iff(isnotempty(InitiatingUserPrincipalName), "User", "Service"),
Source_Network_IPAddress = InitiatingIpAddress,
Source_Network_IPLocation = Source_Network_IPLocation,
//Source_Resource_Name = InitiatingAppName,
Target_Identity_FullName = Target,
Target_Identity_DomainType = iff(Target contains "EXT", 'External', 'Internal'),
Target_Identity_Type = "User",
Target_Resource_ID = "",
Target_Resource_Type = "Entra ID"
Entités déclarées
Contenus associés
Liens établis à partir des identifiants déclarés et des manifests des solutions.
Traçabilité de la source
GitHubLes valeurs affichées proviennent des fichiers du dépôt Azure/Azure-Sentinel. Elles décrivent le modèle publié, pas la configuration de votre workspace.
- Commit
9800e51↗- Identifiant source
fad0f8b9-a0a5-430a-9a94-049a1144bf54
GSTEP / SUIVI DU CATALOGUE
Ajouté au catalogue : 16 sept. 2026 · 05:49 UTC
Dernier changement observé : 16 sept. 2026 · 05:49 UTC