↳ Source GitHubRègle analytiqueMedium

Gain Code Execution on ADFS Server via SMB + Remote Service or Scheduled Task

Description

'This query detects instances where an attacker has gained the ability to execute code on an ADFS Server through SMB and Remote Service or Scheduled Task.'
Type de règle
Scheduled
Version
1.2.1
Statut déclaré
Available
Fréquence
1d
Période analysée
7d
Déclenchement
gt 0

Couverture MITRE déclarée

Sources déclarées

Métadonnées du fichier source. Aucune dépendance déduite du KQL.

Connecteurs

Types de données

Requête KQL

Requête originale, sans modification.

let timeframe = 1d;
// Adjust for a longer timeframe for identifying ADFS Servers
let lookback = 6d;
// Identify ADFS Servers
let ADFS_Servers = (
SecurityEvent
| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe+lookback)
| where EventID == 4688 and SubjectLogonId != "0x3e4"
| where NewProcessName has "Microsoft.IdentityServer.ServiceHost.exe"
| distinct Computer
);
SecurityEvent
| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe)
| where Computer in~ (ADFS_Servers)
| where Account !endswith "$"
// Check for scheduled task events
| where EventID in (4697, 4698, 4699, 4700, 4701, 4702)
| extend EventDataParsed = parse_xml(EventData)
| extend SubjectLogonId = tostring(EventDataParsed.EventData.Data[3]["#text"])
// Check specifically for access to IPC$ share and PIPE\svcctl and PIPE\atsvc for Service Control Services and Schedule Control Services
| union (
    SecurityEvent
    | where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe)
    | where Computer in~ (ADFS_Servers)
    | where Account !endswith "$"
    | where EventID == 5145
    | where RelativeTargetName =~ "svcctl" or RelativeTargetName  =~ "atsvc"
)
// Check for lateral movement
| join kind=inner
(SecurityEvent
| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe)
| where Account !endswith "$"
| where EventID == 4624 and LogonType == 3
) on $left.SubjectLogonId == $right.TargetLogonId
| project TimeGenerated, Account, Computer, EventID, RelativeTargetName
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated
| extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))
| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)
| extend AccountName = tostring(split(Account, @'\')[1]), AccountNTDomain = tostring(split(Account, @'\')[0])

Entités déclarées

AccountHost

Contenus associés

Liens établis à partir des identifiants déclarés et des manifests des solutions.

Traçabilité de la source

GitHub

Les valeurs affichées proviennent des fichiers du dépôt Azure/Azure-Sentinel. Elles décrivent le modèle publié, pas la configuration de votre workspace.

Identifiant source
12dcea64-bec2-41c9-9df2-9f28461b1295
Autres fichiers source 3Solutions/Windows Security Events/Analytic Rules/GainCodeExecutionADFSViaSMB.yamlsource ↗Detections/SecurityEvent/GainCodeExecutionADFSViaSMB.yamlmigration-note ↗Solutions/Windows Security Events/Data/Solution_Windows Security Events.jsonsolution-membership ↗
GSTEP / SUIVI DU CATALOGUE

Ajouté au catalogue : 16 sept. 2026 · 05:49 UTC
Dernier changement observé : 16 sept. 2026 · 05:49 UTC

Dates de synchronisation GSTEP, distinctes des dates de publication du contenu source.