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AD FS Remote Auth Sync Connection

Description

'This detection uses Security events from the "AD FS Auditing" provider to detect suspicious authentication events on an AD FS server. The results then get correlated with events from the Windows Filtering Platform (WFP) to detect suspicious incoming network traffic on port 80 on the AD FS server. This could be a sign of a threat actor trying to use replication services on the AD FS server to get its configuration settings and extract sensitive information such as AD FS certificates. In order to use this query you need to enable AD FS auditing on the AD FS Server. References: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/identity/ad-fs/troubleshooting/ad-fs-tshoot-logging https://twitter.com/OTR_Community/status/1387038995016732672'
Rule type
Scheduled
Version
1.0.4
Declared status
Available
Query frequency
1d
Query period
1d
Trigger
gt 0

Declared MITRE coverage

Declared sources

Metadata from the source file. No dependencies inferred from KQL.

Connectors

Data types

KQL query

Original query, unchanged.

// Adjust this to use a longer timeframe to identify ADFS servers
//let lookback = 0d;
// Adjust this to adjust detection timeframe
//let timeframe = 1d;
// SamAccountName of AD FS Service Account. Filter on the use of a specific AD FS user account
//let adfsuser = 'adfsadmin';
// Identify ADFS Servers
let ADFS_Servers = (
    SecurityEvent
    //| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe+lookback)
    | where EventSourceName == 'AD FS Auditing'
    | distinct Computer
);
SecurityEvent
    //| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe)
    | where Computer in~ (ADFS_Servers)
    // A token of type 'http://schemas.microsoft.com/ws/2006/05/servicemodel/tokens/SecureConversation'
    // for relying party '-' was successfully authenticated.
    | where EventID == 412
    | extend EventData = parse_xml(EventData).EventData.Data
    | extend InstanceId = tostring(EventData[0])
| join kind=inner
(
    SecurityEvent
    //| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe)
    | where Computer in~ (ADFS_Servers)
    // Events to identify caller identity from event 412
    | where EventID == 501
    | extend EventData = parse_xml(EventData).EventData.Data
    | where tostring(EventData[1]) contains 'identity/claims/name'
    | extend InstanceId = tostring(EventData[0])
    | extend ClaimsName = tostring(EventData[2])
    // Filter on the use of a specific AD FS user account
    //| where ClaimsName contains adfsuser
)
on $left.InstanceId == $right.InstanceId
| join kind=inner
(
    SecurityEvent
    | where EventID == 5156
    | where Computer in~ (ADFS_Servers)
    | extend EventData = parse_xml(EventData).EventData.Data
    | mv-expand bagexpansion=array EventData
    | evaluate bag_unpack(EventData)
    | extend Key = tostring(column_ifexists('@Name', "")), Value = column_ifexists('#text', "")
    | evaluate pivot(Key, any(Value), TimeGenerated, Computer, EventID)
    | extend DestPort = column_ifexists("DestPort", ""),
          Direction = column_ifexists("Direction", ""),
          Application = column_ifexists("Application", ""),
          DestAddress = column_ifexists("DestAddress", ""),
          SourceAddress = column_ifexists("SourceAddress", ""),
          SourcePort = column_ifexists("SourcePort", "")
    // Look for inbound connections from endpoints on port 80
    | where DestPort == 80 and Direction == '%%14592' and Application == 'System'
    | where DestAddress !in ('::1','0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1')
)
on $left.Computer == $right.Computer
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, ClaimsName, SourceAddress, SourcePort
| extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))
| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)
| extend AccountName = tostring(split(ClaimsName, @'\')[1]), AccountNTDomain = tostring(split(ClaimsName, @'\')[0])

Declared entities

AccountHostIP

Related content

Links established from declared identifiers and solution manifests.

Source provenance

GitHub

Displayed values come from files in Azure/Azure-Sentinel. They describe the published template, not your workspace configuration.

Source identifier
2f4165a6-c4fb-4e94-861e-37f1b4d6c0e6
Additional source files 3Solutions/Windows Security Events/Analytic Rules/ADFSRemoteAuthSyncConnection.yamlsource ↗Detections/SecurityEvent/ADFSRemoteAuthSyncConnection.yamlmigration-note ↗Solutions/Windows Security Events/Data/Solution_Windows Security Events.jsonsolution-membership ↗
GSTEP / CATALOG TRACKING

Added to catalog : 16 Sept 2026 · 05:49 UTC
Last change observed : 16 Sept 2026 · 05:49 UTC

GSTEP sync dates, separate from the source content’s publication dates.