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SAP BTP - Unaudited custom app with login-only activity

Description

Identifies SAP BTP custom applications (CloudFoundry, SAP CAP, etc.) that only produce XSUAA authentication events (TokenIssuedEvent, ClientAuthenticationSuccess) but have not generated any business audit log activity in the past 7 days. This pattern indicates that the application has not implemented audit logging (e.g., missing @AuditLog annotations in CAP or missing audit log service bindings), creating a security blind spot where user actions within the application are invisible to monitoring. The 7-day lookback avoids false positives for properly instrumented apps whose users simply have not performed auditable actions in the current session. Attackers could exploit such unaudited applications to perform malicious operations without detection.
Rule type
Scheduled
Version
1.0.4
Declared status
Available
Query frequency
1h
Query period
7d
Trigger
gt 0

Declared MITRE coverage

Declared sources

Metadata from the source file. No dependencies inferred from KQL.

Connectors

Data types

KQL query

Original query, unchanged.

// Lookback period for audit events - a longer window avoids false positives for
// properly instrumented apps where users logged in but haven't performed actions yet
let audit_lookback = ago(7d);
// Known BTP platform service patterns (excluded from detection)
let platform_service_patterns = dynamic([
    "app-studio", "auditlog", "cis-local", "service-manager",
    "destination-xsappname", "connectivity-proxy", "feature-flags"
]);
// Step 1: From XSUAA TokenIssuedEvent, identify custom apps with interactive user logins
// XSUAA is a shared subaccount service - the client_id in each token identifies the actual app
let app_logins = SAPBTPAuditLog_CL
    // Scope logins to the current 1h run cycle (matches queryFrequency)
    | where TimeGenerated > ago(1h)
    | where Category == "audit.security-events"
    | extend data_s = tostring(Message.data)
    | where data_s has "TokenIssuedEvent"
    | extend ParsedData = parse_json(data_s)
    // origin field = client_id of the app the token was issued for
    | extend ClientId = tostring(ParsedData.origin)
    | where ClientId startswith "sb-"
    // Parse nested event message for human user and grant type
    | extend EventMessage = tostring(ParsedData.message)
    | extend GrantType = extract(@'"grant_type"\s*:\s*"([^"]+)"', 1, EventMessage)
    // Only interactive browser-based logins (not service-to-service tokens)
    | where GrantType == "authorization_code"
    // Derive app identifiers: sb-<XsAppName>!t<number>
    | extend XsAppName = extract(@"^sb-(.+?)!\w+$", 1, ClientId)
    | where isnotempty(XsAppName)
    // Exclude known platform services
    | where not(XsAppName has_any (platform_service_patterns))
    // Extract human-readable app name (first segment before subaccount qualifier)
    | extend AppName = extract(@"^([A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9_]*)", 1, XsAppName)
    | extend HumanUser = extract(@'"user_name"\s*:\s*"([^"]+)"', 1, EventMessage)
    | extend IPAddress = tostring(Message.ip);
// Step 2a: Identify apps that have business audit events where the service binding
// identity appears in UserName (e.g. platform-generated audit events)
let audited_apps = SAPBTPAuditLog_CL
    | where TimeGenerated > audit_lookback
    | where Category !in ("audit.security-events")
    | where UserName startswith "sb-"
    | extend AuditedAppName = extract(@"^sb-(.+?)!\w+", 1, UserName)
    | where isnotempty(AuditedAppName)
    | distinct AuditedAppName, Tenant;
// Step 2b: Identify CF app instances that have an audit log service binding.
// When a CAP/custom app binds the audit log service, BTP provisions a
// 'customer-auditlog' service key whose XSUAA token events share the same
// AlsServiceId (CF app GUID) as the app's own login tokens. This gives a
// reliable per-app correlation that works even when the audit log service
// instance is deployed in a different CF space than the app itself.
let audited_app_instances = SAPBTPAuditLog_CL
    | where TimeGenerated > audit_lookback
    | where Category == "audit.security-events"
    | where UserName contains "customer-auditlog"
    | where isnotempty(AlsServiceId)
    | distinct AlsServiceId, Tenant;
// Step 3: Find custom apps with logins but no business audit trail
app_logins
| join kind=leftanti (audited_apps | project XsAppName = AuditedAppName, Tenant) on XsAppName, Tenant
| join kind=leftanti (audited_app_instances) on AlsServiceId, Tenant
| summarize
    LoginCount = count(),
    FirstLogin = min(TimeGenerated),
    LastLogin = max(TimeGenerated),
    Users = make_set(HumanUser, 100),
    IPs = make_set(IPAddress, 100),
    AppName = take_any(AppName),
    SubaccountName = take_any(SubaccountName),
    OrgId = take_any(OrgId),
    SpaceId = take_any(SpaceId)
    by XsAppName, ClientId, Tenant
| extend Users = set_difference(Users, dynamic([""]))
| project
    FirstLogin,
    LastLogin,
    AppName,
    XsAppName,
    ClientId,
    SubaccountName,
    Tenant,
    OrgId,
    SpaceId,
    LoginCount,
    Users,
    IPs,
    CloudApp = "SAP BTP"

Declared entities

CloudApplication

Related content

Links established from declared identifiers and solution manifests.

Source provenance

GitHub

Displayed values come from files in Azure/Azure-Sentinel. They describe the published template, not your workspace configuration.

Source identifier
5e8f2a1b-7c3d-4b9e-a6f0-1d2e3c4b5a6f
Additional source files 2Solutions/SAP BTP/Analytic Rules/BTP - Unaudited custom app with login-only activity.yamlsource ↗Solutions/SAP BTP/Data/Solution_SAPBTP.jsonsolution-membership ↗
GSTEP / CATALOG TRACKING

Added to catalog : 16 Sept 2026 · 05:49 UTC
Last change observed : 16 Sept 2026 · 05:49 UTC

GSTEP sync dates, separate from the source content’s publication dates.