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PowerShell Encoded Command Execution (Living off the Land)

Description

Detects PowerShell or pwsh.exe launched with encoded command flags (-EncodedCommand, -enc, -ec, -enco). Attackers encode commands in Base64 to obfuscate malicious payloads and bypass script-based controls. Risk is elevated when a download cradle pattern is also detected. Tune AllowlistedParents for known-safe management tools such as SCCM.
Rule type
Scheduled
Version
1.0.4
Declared status
Available
Query frequency
1h
Query period
1h
Trigger
gt 0

Declared MITRE coverage

Declared sources

Metadata from the source file. No dependencies inferred from KQL.

Connectors

Data types

KQL query

Original query, unchanged.

let Lookback = 1h;
let EncodedFlagRegex = @'(?i)(^|\s)-(encodedcommand|enc|ec|enco)\b';
let AllowlistedParents = dynamic([
  "SqlServer.exe", "ManagementStudio.exe", "devenv.exe",
  "ccmexec.exe", "SMSAgent.exe"
]);
let DownloadCradlePatterns = dynamic([
  "Net.WebClient", "WebRequest", "DownloadString", "DownloadFile",
  "IEX", "Invoke-Expression", "Invoke-RestMethod", "Start-BitsTransfer"
]);
let MDE_Results =
  DeviceProcessEvents
  | where Timestamp >= ago(Lookback)
  | where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe")
  | where ProcessCommandLine matches regex EncodedFlagRegex
  | where not(InitiatingProcessFileName has_any (AllowlistedParents))
  | extend
      HasDownloadCradle = ProcessCommandLine has_any (DownloadCradlePatterns),
      AccountName       = InitiatingProcessAccountName,
      AccountDomain     = InitiatingProcessAccountDomain,
      HostName          = DeviceName,
      EventTime         = Timestamp
  | project EventTime, HostName, AccountName, AccountDomain,
      ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, HasDownloadCradle;
let SecEvent_Results =
  SecurityEvent
  | where TimeGenerated >= ago(Lookback)
  | where EventID == 4688
  | where NewProcessName endswith "\\powershell.exe"
      or NewProcessName endswith "\\pwsh.exe"
  | where CommandLine matches regex EncodedFlagRegex
  | where not(ParentProcessName has_any (AllowlistedParents))
  | extend
      HasDownloadCradle     = CommandLine has_any (DownloadCradlePatterns),
      AccountName           = SubjectUserName,
      AccountDomain         = SubjectDomainName,
      HostName              = Computer,
      EventTime             = TimeGenerated,
      ProcessCommandLine    = CommandLine,
      InitiatingProcessFileName = ParentProcessName
  | project EventTime, HostName, AccountName, AccountDomain,
      ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, HasDownloadCradle;
union MDE_Results, SecEvent_Results
| extend RiskScore = iif(HasDownloadCradle, 2, 1)
| sort by RiskScore desc, EventTime desc

Declared entities

HostAccountProcess

Related content

Links established from declared identifiers and solution manifests.

Source provenance

GitHub

Displayed values come from files in Azure/Azure-Sentinel. They describe the published template, not your workspace configuration.

Source identifier
7b2f4d1a-9c3e-4f72-8b1d-3e6a9f2c4b8d
Additional source files 2Solutions/Attacker Tools Threat Protection Essentials/Analytic Rules/PowerShell-Abuse.yamlsource ↗Solutions/Attacker Tools Threat Protection Essentials/Data/Solution_AttackersToolsThreatProtectionEssentials.jsonsolution-membership ↗
GSTEP / CATALOG TRACKING

Added to catalog : 16 Sept 2026 · 05:49 UTC
Last change observed : 16 Sept 2026 · 05:49 UTC

GSTEP sync dates, separate from the source content’s publication dates.