↳ GitHub sourceAnalytics ruleHigh
Zinc Actor IOCs files - October 2022
Description
'Identifies a match across filename and commandline IOC's related to an actor tracked by Microsoft as Zinc.
Reference: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/09/29/zinc-weaponizing-open-source-software/'
- Rule type
- Scheduled
- Version
- 1.0.3
- Declared status
- Available
- Query frequency
- 6h
- Query period
- 6h
- Trigger
- gt 0
Declared MITRE coverage
Declared sources
Metadata from the source file. No dependencies inferred from KQL.
Connectors
Data types
KQL query
Original query, unchanged.
let iocs = externaldata(DateAdded:string,IoC:string,Type:string) [@"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/master/Sample%20Data/Feeds/ZincOctober2022IOCs.csv"] with (format="csv", ignoreFirstRecord=True);
let file_path = (iocs | where Type =~ "filepath" | project IoC);
let commandline = (iocs | where Type =~ "commandline" | project IoC);
(union isfuzzy=true
(DeviceNetworkEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFolderPath has_any (file_path) or InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any (commandline)
| project TimeGenerated, ActionType, DeviceId, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessFileName, RemoteIP, RemoteUrl, LocalIP, Type
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, HostEntity = DeviceName
),
(Event
| where Source =~ "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon"
| where EventID == 1
| extend EvData = parse_xml(EventData)
| extend EventDetail = EvData.DataItem.EventData.Data
| extend Image = EventDetail.[4].["#text"], CommandLine = EventDetail.[10].["#text"]
| where Image has_any (file_path) or CommandLine has_any (commandline)
| project TimeGenerated, EventDetail, UserName, Computer, Type, Source, CommandLine, Image
| extend Type = strcat(Type, ": ", Source)
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, HostEntity = Computer , AccountEntity = UserName, ProcessEntity = tostring(split(Image, '\\', -1)[-1])
),
(DeviceProcessEvents
| where ( InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any (file_path)) or ( InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any (commandline)) or (InitiatingProcessFolderPath has_any (file_path)) or (InitiatingProcessFolderPath has_any (commandline)) or (FolderPath has_any (file_path)) or (FolderPath has_any (commandline))
| project TimeGenerated, ActionType, DeviceId, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessSHA256, FolderPath, Type
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, HostEntity = DeviceName , AccountEntity = InitiatingProcessAccountName, ProcessEntity = InitiatingProcessFileName
),
(DeviceFileEvents
| where (InitiatingProcessFolderPath has_any (file_path)) or (InitiatingProcessFolderPath has_any (commandline)) or (FolderPath has_any (file_path)) or (FolderPath has_any (commandline)) or ( InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any (commandline)) or ( InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any (file_path))
| project TimeGenerated, ActionType, DeviceId, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessFileName, RequestAccountName, RequestSourceIP, InitiatingProcessSHA256, FolderPath, Type
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, HostEntity = DeviceName , AccountEntity = RequestAccountName, ProcessEntity = InitiatingProcessFileName, AlgorithmEntity = "SHA256", FileHashEntity = InitiatingProcessSHA256
),
(DeviceEvents
| where ( InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any (file_path)) or ( InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any (commandline)) or (InitiatingProcessFolderPath has_any (file_path)) or (InitiatingProcessFolderPath has_any (commandline)) or (FolderPath has_any (file_path)) or (FolderPath has_any (commandline))
| project TimeGenerated, ActionType, DeviceId, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FolderPath, Type
| extend CommandLine = InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, HostEntity = DeviceName , AccountEntity = InitiatingProcessAccountName, ProcessEntity = InitiatingProcessFileName
),
(SecurityEvent
| where EventID == 4688
| where ( CommandLine has_any (file_path)) or ( CommandLine has_any (commandline)) or (NewProcessName has_any (file_path)) or (NewProcessName has_any (commandline)) or (ParentProcessName has_any (file_path)) or (ParentProcessName has_any (commandline))
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, NewProcessName, ParentProcessName, Account, NewProcessId, Type
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, HostEntity = Computer , AccountEntity = Account, ProcessEntity = NewProcessName
)
)
| extend HostName = tostring(split(HostEntity, '.', 0)[0]), DnsDomain = tostring(strcat_array(array_slice(split(HostEntity, '.'), 1, -1), '.'))
| extend Name = tostring(split(AccountEntity, '@', 0)[0]), UPNSuffix = tostring(split(AccountEntity, '@', 1)[0])
Declared entities
Related content
Links established from declared identifiers and solution manifests.
Source provenance
GitHubDisplayed values come from files in Azure/Azure-Sentinel. They describe the published template, not your workspace configuration.
- Commit
9800e51↗- Source identifier
9a7f6651-801b-491c-a548-8b454b356eaa
GSTEP / CATALOG TRACKING
Added to catalog : 16 Sept 2026 · 05:49 UTC
Last change observed : 16 Sept 2026 · 05:49 UTC