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AWSCloudTrail - Privilege escalation via CRUD DynamoDB policy

Description

Detects creation of inline IAM policies that grant broad DynamoDB create, read, update, and delete permissions. Attackers may use this access expansion to manipulate data stores and escalate influence across cloud workloads.

Type de règle: Scheduled
Version: 1.0.2
Statut déclaré: Available
Fréquence: 1d
Période analysée: 1d
Déclenchement: gt 0

Couverture MITRE déclarée

PrivilegeEscalation T1098.003

Sources déclarées

Métadonnées du fichier source. Aucune dépendance déduite du KQL.

Connecteurs

AWS

Types de données

AWSCloudTrail

Requête KQL

Requête originale, sans modification.

AWSCloudTrail
| where EventName in ("PutUserPolicy","PutRolePolicy","PutGroupPolicy") and isempty(ErrorCode) and isempty(ErrorMessage)
| extend PolicyName = tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).policyName)
| extend Statement = parse_json(tostring((parse_json(RequestParameters).policyDocument))).Statement
| mvexpand Statement
| extend Action = parse_json(Statement).Action , Effect = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Effect), Resource = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Resource), Condition = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Condition)
| extend Action = tostring(Action)
| where Effect =~ "Allow" and ((Action contains "dynamodb:Create" or Action contains "dynamodb:Put") and (Action contains "dynamodb:Describe" or Action contains "dynamodb:Get" or Action contains "dynamodb:Scan")  and Action contains "dynamodb:Update" and Action contains "dynamodb:Delete") and Resource == "*" and Condition == ""
| extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
| extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
| extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
| extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
  AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "")
| distinct TimeGenerated, EventName, PolicyName, SourceIpAddress, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, UserIdentityArn, UserIdentityUserName

Entités déclarées

AccountIP

Contenus associés

Liens établis à partir des identifiants déclarés et des manifests des solutions.

Traçabilité de la source

GitHub

Les valeurs affichées proviennent des fichiers du dépôt Azure/Azure-Sentinel. Elles décrivent le modèle publié, pas la configuration de votre workspace.

Fichier: Solutions/Amazon Web Services/Analytic Rules/AWS_PrivilegeEscalationviaCRUDDynamoDB.yaml ↗
Commit: 7ca9800 ↗
Identifiant source: b9be2aa6-911d-4131-8658-d2a537ed49f4

Autres fichiers source 2

Solutions/Amazon Web Services/Analytic Rules/AWS_PrivilegeEscalationviaCRUDDynamoDB.yamlsource ↗Solutions/Amazon Web Services/Data/Solution_AmazonWebServices.jsonsolution-membership ↗

GSTEP / SUIVI DU CATALOGUE

Ajouté au catalogue : 16 sept. 2026 · 05:49 UTC
Dernier changement observé : 16 sept. 2026 · 05:49 UTC

Dates de synchronisation GSTEP, distinctes des dates de publication du contenu source.