↳ GitHub sourceAnalytics ruleHigh

Suspicious application consent similar to O365 Attack Toolkit

Description

'This will alert when a user consents to provide a previously-unknown Azure application with the same OAuth permissions used by the MDSec O365 Attack Toolkit (https://github.com/mdsecactivebreach/o365-attack-toolkit). The default permissions/scope for the MDSec O365 Attack toolkit change sometimes but often include contacts.read, user.read, mail.read, notes.read.all, mailboxsettings.readwrite, files.readwrite.all, mail.send, files.read, and files.read.all. Consent to applications with these permissions should be rare, especially as the knownApplications list is expanded, especially as the knownApplications list is expanded. Public contributions to expand this filter are welcome! For further information on AuditLogs please see https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/reports-monitoring/reference-audit-activities.'
Rule type
Scheduled
Version
1.1.2
Declared status
Available
Query frequency
1d
Query period
14d
Trigger
gt 0

Declared MITRE coverage

Declared sources

Metadata from the source file. No dependencies inferred from KQL.

Connectors

Data types

KQL query

Original query, unchanged.

let detectionTime = 1d;
let joinLookback = 14d;
let threshold = 5;
let o365_attack_regex = "contacts.read|user.read|mail.read|notes.read.all|mailboxsettings.readwrite|Files.ReadWrite.All|mail.send|files.read|files.read.all";
let o365_attack = dynamic(["contacts.read", "user.read", "mail.read", "notes.read.all", "mailboxsettings.readwrite", "Files.ReadWrite.All", "mail.send", "files.read", "files.read.all"]);
AuditLogs
| where TimeGenerated > ago(detectionTime)
| where LoggedByService =~ "Core Directory"
| where Category =~ "ApplicationManagement"
| where OperationName =~ "Consent to application"
| mv-apply TargetResource = TargetResources on 
  (
      where TargetResource.type =~ "ServicePrincipal"
      | extend AppDisplayName = tostring(TargetResource.displayName),
               AppClientId = tostring(TargetResource.id),
               props = TargetResource.modifiedProperties
  )
| where AppClientId !in ((externaldata(knownAppClientId:string, knownAppDisplayName:string)[@"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/master/Sample%20Data/Feeds/Microsoft.OAuth.KnownApplications.csv"] with (format="csv"))) // NOTE: a MATCH from this list will cause the alert to NOT fire - please modify for your environment!
| mv-apply ConsentFull = props on 
  (
      where ConsentFull.displayName =~ "ConsentAction.Permissions"
  )
| parse ConsentFull with * "ConsentType: " GrantConsentType ", Scope: " GrantScope1 ", CreatedDateTime" * "]" *
| where GrantConsentType != "AllPrincipals" // NOTE: we are ignoring if OAuth application was granted to all users via an admin - but admin due diligence should be audited occasionally
| where ConsentFull has_any (o365_attack)  
| extend GrantScopeCount = countof(tolower(GrantScope1), o365_attack_regex, 'regex')
| where GrantScopeCount > threshold
| extend GrantInitiatedByAppName = tostring(InitiatedBy.app.displayName)
| extend GrantInitiatedByAppServicePrincipalId = tostring(InitiatedBy.app.servicePrincipalId)
| extend GrantInitiatedByUserPrincipalName = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName)
| extend GrantInitiatedByAadUserId = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.id)
| extend GrantIpAddress = iff(isnotempty(InitiatedBy.user.ipAddress), tostring(InitiatedBy.user.ipAddress), tostring(InitiatedBy.app.ipAddress))
| extend GrantInitiatedBy = iff(isnotempty(GrantInitiatedByUserPrincipalName), GrantInitiatedByUserPrincipalName, GrantInitiatedByAppName)
| mv-apply AdditionalDetail = AdditionalDetails on 
  (
      where AdditionalDetail.key =~ "User-Agent"
      | extend GrantUserAgent = AdditionalDetail.value
  )
| project TimeGenerated, GrantConsentType, GrantScope1, GrantInitiatedBy, AppDisplayName, GrantInitiatedByUserPrincipalName, GrantInitiatedByAadUserId, GrantInitiatedByAppName, GrantInitiatedByAppServicePrincipalId, GrantIpAddress, GrantUserAgent, AppClientId, OperationName, ConsentFull, CorrelationId
| join kind = leftouter (AuditLogs
  | where TimeGenerated > ago(joinLookback)
  | where LoggedByService =~ "Core Directory"
  | where Category =~ "ApplicationManagement"
  | where OperationName =~ "Add service principal"
  | mv-apply TargetResource = TargetResources on 
      (
          where TargetResource.type =~ "ServicePrincipal"
          | extend props = TargetResource.modifiedProperties,
                  AppClientId = tostring(TargetResource.id)
      )
  | mv-apply Property = props on 
      (
          where Property.displayName =~ "AppAddress" and Property.newValue has "AddressType"
          | extend AppReplyURLs = trim('"',tostring(Property.newValue))
      )
  | distinct AppClientId, tostring(AppReplyURLs)
) on AppClientId
| join kind = innerunique (AuditLogs
      | where TimeGenerated > ago(joinLookback)
      | where LoggedByService =~ "Core Directory"
      | where Category =~ "ApplicationManagement"
      | where OperationName =~ "Add OAuth2PermissionGrant" or OperationName =~ "Add delegated permission grant"
          | mv-apply TargetResource = TargetResources on 
          (
              where TargetResource.type =~ "ServicePrincipal" and array_length(TargetResource.modifiedProperties) > 0 and isnotnull(TargetResource.displayName)
              | extend GrantAuthentication = tostring(TargetResource.displayName)
          )
      | extend GrantOperation = OperationName
      | project GrantAuthentication, GrantOperation, CorrelationId
  ) on CorrelationId
| project TimeGenerated, GrantConsentType, GrantScope1, GrantInitiatedBy, AppDisplayName, AppReplyURLs, GrantInitiatedByUserPrincipalName, GrantInitiatedByAadUserId, GrantInitiatedByAppName, GrantInitiatedByAppServicePrincipalId, GrantIpAddress, GrantUserAgent, AppClientId, GrantAuthentication, OperationName, GrantOperation, CorrelationId, ConsentFull
| extend Name = tostring(split(GrantInitiatedByUserPrincipalName,'@',0)[0]), UPNSuffix = tostring(split(GrantInitiatedByUserPrincipalName,'@',1)[0])

Declared entities

AccountIPCloudApplication

Related content

Links established from declared identifiers and solution manifests.

Source provenance

GitHub

Displayed values come from files in Azure/Azure-Sentinel. They describe the published template, not your workspace configuration.

Source identifier
f948a32f-226c-4116-bddd-d95e91d97eb9
Additional source files 3Solutions/Microsoft Entra ID/Analytic Rules/MaliciousOAuthApp_O365AttackToolkit.yamlsource ↗Detections/AuditLogs/MaliciousOAuthApp_O365AttackToolkit.yamlmigration-note ↗Solutions/Microsoft Entra ID/Data/Solution_AAD.jsonsolution-membership ↗
GSTEP / CATALOG TRACKING

Added to catalog : 16 Sept 2026 · 05:49 UTC
Last change observed : 16 Sept 2026 · 05:49 UTC

GSTEP sync dates, separate from the source content’s publication dates.